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ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING WAS BASED ENTIRELY 
UPON STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL CONCLUSIONS, 
THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW IS DE NOVO. 
The parties disagree as to what standard of review should be applied. While 
Appellant maintains that the correct standard of review is de novo, Appellee asserts in his 
brief that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion. As an initial matter, 
therefore, this Court must determine which standard applies. 
Appellee makes two arguments for applying the abuse of discretion standard: 
First, he states that "[t]he determination . . . not to award attorney's fees pursuant to [the 
statute] is one that is made at the discretion of the trial court pursuant to the very language 
of the statute itself." Appellee's Brief, 1. Appellee's first argument, therefore, is that the 
more deferential standard should be used because the statute allows for a discretionary 
award. Utah courts have universally held, however, that it is the trial court's reasoning, 
and not the underlying statute, that determines which standard of review is appropriate. 
Second, Appellee asserts that, in its ruling, "the trial court properly exercised its 
discretion not to award attorney fees for several reasons." Appellee's Brief, 19. 
Appellee's second argument, therefore, is that the trial court's ruling on attorney fees was 
based upon that court's exercise of discretion. This argument, like the first, is 
unpersuasive. The trial court's decision not to grant attorney fees was based entirely upon 
1 
legal conclusions and statutory interpretation, not on the trial court's discretion. In fact, 
all that the trial court determined was that pursuant to Utah Code section 78B-5-826, 
Unicity could not recover attorney fees because Hooban had "never executed the 
agreement and cannot be bound by its terms." (R. 1843.) Because the trial court's ruling 
was entirely based upon legal conclusions and statutory interpretation, the correct 
standard of review is de novo. 
1. De novo review is the appropriate standard when, as here, a trial 
court's decision is based upon statutory interpretation. 
Generally speaking, de novo is the appropriate standard of review when a trial 
court's decision rests upon statutory interpretation. See, e.g.. Carter v. Univ. of Utah 
Med. Ctr.. 2006 UT 78, f 8, 150 P.3d 467 ("We review questions of statutory 
interpretation for correctness, granting no deference to the district court's decision."). De 
novo is also the appropriate standard in the specific situation here, where the trial court 
engages in statutory interpretation of a statute which grants that court discretion. As the 
Utah Supreme Court has stated, "trial courts do not have discretion to misapply the law. 
Therefore, legal determinations concerning the proper interpretation of the statute which 
grants the trial court discretion are reviewed for correctness." State v. Peterson, 810 P.2d 
421, 425 (Utah 1991); see also Adams v. State. 2005 UT 62, 123 P.3d 400 ("Because 
legal determinations concerning the proper interpretation of [a] statute which grants the 
trial court discretion are reviewed for correctness, we apply a de novo standard here . . . . " 
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(quotation marks omitted) (modification in original)); State v. Hankerson, 2005 UT 47, f 
4, 122 P.3d 561 (holding that although the statute at issue granted discretion to the trial 
court, legal determinations concerning the proper interpretation of that statute must be 
reviewed for correctness). Appellee is therefore incorrect in asserting that, because an 
award of attorney fees is discretionary "pursuant to the very language of the statute 
itself," an abuse of discretion standard should apply. Appellee's Brief, 1. 
In the instant case, the trial court's ruling was based entirely upon its interpretation 
of Utah Code section 78B-5-826. In its ruling, the trial court stated that: 
The critical language of [the statute] has also been overlooked 
by defendant. In order for the provision to apply, inter alia, 
the promissory note, written contract, or other writing must 
have been executed after April 28, 1986 (emphasis added). 
[The trial court then quoted the definition of the word 
"executed" from Black's Law Dictionary.] 
If the agreement has been completed and signed by 
these parties and Mr. Hooban has immediate rights, then he 
would have standing to sue under the agreement. But he has 
never executed the agreement and cannot be bound by its 
terms.... That is the law of the case and the parties are 
bound by that ruling. 
(R. 1843-44.) The trial court's ruling was thus based upon its interpretation of Utah 
Code section 78B-5-826.1 Because the decision was based upon statutory interpretation, 
1
 The interpretation of section 78B-5-826 by the trial court was flawed. The statute 
states, in relevant part, that "[a] court may award costs and attorney fees to either party 
that prevails in a civil action based upon any [writing] executed after April 28, 1986 . . . . " 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826. The clear intent of the relevant clause is to ensure that the 
statute, which was enacted in April 1986, was not applied retroactively. It should not be 
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pursuant to Utah law it should be reviewed de novo for correctness. 
2. A trial court's conclusions of law, including determinations that 
attorney fees cannot be awarded, are reviewed for correctness. 
A trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. See, e.g.. State v. One 
1980 Cadillac, 2001 UT 26, f 8, 21 P.3d 212 ("A trial court's conclusions of law in civil 
cases are reviewed for correctness. Under the correctness standard, no deference is given 
to the trial court's ruling on questions of law." (citation omitted)). The reason behind the 
use of the de novo standard was explained by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Levin, 
2006 UT 50, 144 P.3d 1096, as follows: 
an appellate court reviews a trial court's conclusions of law 
for correctness because "a single trial judge is in an inferior 
position to determine what the legal content of [a legal 
concept] should be [whereas] a panel of appellate judges, with 
their collective experience and their broader perspective, is 
better suited to that task." 
Levin, 2006 UT 50, fflf 19-23 (quoting State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 
1993)) (modifications in original). In accordance with this general principle, Utah courts 
have consistently held that decisions about whether attorney fees may be awarded are to 
be reviewed de novo. See Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, f 127, 130 P.3d 325 ('The 
award of attorney fees is a matter of law, which we review for correctness."); R.T. 
Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11,116, 40 P.3d 1119 ("Whether attorney fees are 
used to impose a requirement that the party against whom fees are sought was the same 
party that actually executed the writing. 
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recoverable is a question of law, which we review for correctness/'); Valcarce v. 
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 3G5, 315 (Utah 1998) ("Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an 
action is a question of law, which we review for correctness."). 
In this case, the trial court determined that, as a matter of law, Unicity could not 
recover attorney fees.2 Although the trial court noted generally that, under the statute, it 
could "take into account the very unique circumstances and facts of each case," it based 
its decision entirely upon legal conclusions: "[Hooban] has never executed the agreement 
and cannot be bound by its terms. Judge Schofield found that he lacked standing. That is 
the law of the case and the parties are bound by that ruling." (R. 1843.) Although 
Appellee argues that the trial court exercised discretion in ruling on Unicity's motion for 
attorney fees, Appellee has been unable to identify a single instance thereof in the trial 
court's ruling. Because the ruling was based entirely upon the trial court's legal 
conclusions, therefore, the appropriate standard is de novo review. 
2
 It is unclear from the trial court's ruling whether the statements on pages six and 
seven of the ruling are part of the trial court's reasoning, merely a summary of Appellee's 
arguments, or both. See R. 1845 ("If Mr. Hooban was not a party to the agreement, the 
terms of the agreement, including the prevailing party provision, do not apply to him."); 
id. 1844 ("Certainly, the statute's intent only permits the recovery of attorneys' fees by 
one party to a contract against another party to the contract. I[t] is not applicable simply 
because a contract is the underlying basis for the claim."); kL ("It is clear . . . that Unicity 
cannot recover attorneys' fees pursuant to the statu[t]e based on the prevailing party 
language of the Agreement, regardless of the scope or typicality of that language."). It is 
irrelevant, however, whether the statements in question are integral to the trial court's 
reasoning or dicta. If they are dicta, then they have no bearing on the appropriate 
standard of review. If they are part of the trial court's reasoning, then, because they are 
legal conclusions, de novo review is appropriate. 
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II. THE CASES CITED BY APPELLEE HOOBAN ARE INAPPOSITE TO 
THE ISSUE OF THIS APPEAL OR HAVE BEEN SUPERSEDED BY 
CONTROLLING PRECEDENT. 
Appellee cites three cases in support of its argument that Unicity cannot recover 
attorney fees in this action. Each of these citations misconstrues Appellant's position 
and/or the case law. 
1. The cases cited by Appellee are irrelevant to the stated issue on appeal. 
The first case cited by Appellee is Fericks v. Lucy Ann Souffe Trust. 2004 UT 85, 
100 P.3d 1200, which Appellee cites for the proposition that "[i]f Mr. Hooban was not a 
party to the agreement, the terms of the agreement, including the attorney's fees provision 
. . . cannot apply to him." Appellee's Brief, 9. Fericks is easily distinguishable from the 
instant case. In Fericks, the party seeking attorney fees was seeking to enforce the 
contractual provision for attorney fees in the real estate agreement; Unicity, on the other 
hand, is seeking attorney fees through Utah Code section 78B-5-826, not through the 
agreement. Fericks does not mention section 78B-5-826, is not based thereon, and is 
therefore irrelevant to this appeal. 
Appellee also cites West v. Case, 2006 UT App 325, 142 P.3d 576, as support for 
his argument. As with Fericks, West does not even mention the statute at issue here. 
Because it does not relate to section 78B-5-826, West is irrelevant to this appeal. West 
can also be distinguished because the party originally ordered to pay attorney fees in that 
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case had never claimed to be a party to the agreement. See West 2006 UT App 325, fflj 
2-6. Here, on the other hand, Hooban sued Unicity based entirely on the theory that he 
could enforce the agreement against Unicity—including the attorney fees provision of the 
agreement. West is therefore inapposite to the issue here. 
Appellee's citation to Fericks and West highlights one of the fundamental problem 
with Appellee's brief: Appellee's repeated assertions that Unicity is attempting to bind 
Hooban to the attorney fees provision of the contract. That is neither Unicity's argument 
nor its intent. Unicity fully recognizes that it "cannot establish a contractual claim to 
attorney's fees." Bilanzich v. LonettL 2007 UT 26, f 12, 160 P.2d 1041. Unicity has 
consistently argued that Hooban is not a party to the agreement; likewise, Unicity has 
never argued that Hooban is bound by the attorney fee provision of the agreement.3 
Contrary to Appellee's assertions, Unicity's argument is not based upon enforcing 
a contractual provision. Instead, Unicity is seeking that the Court recognize that Hooban 
has a statutory obligation to reimburse Unicity's attorney fees. According to both the 
plain language and the Utah Supreme Court's interpretation of Utah Code section 78B-5-
826, because Hooban sued Unicity based upon an agreement that had an attorney fees 
provision, and because Hooban would have been entitled to attorney fees if he had been 
3
 Appellee also repeatedly invokes the marshaling requirement, apparently 
referring to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9), which states that "[a] party 
challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding." Because Unicity is not challenging any factual finding, the 
marshaling requirement does not apply. 
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successful on his claims, Unicity should be allowed to seek to recover attorney fees 
incurred in defending against the lawsuit brought by Hooban. 
2. The language cited from Anglin v. Contractor Fabrication Machining 
has been since superseded by the Utah Supreme Court in Bilanzich v. 
Lonetti. 
The case that Appellee relies most heavily upon is Anglin v. Contractor 
Fabrication Machining. 2001 UT App 341, 37 P.3d 267. Unlike Fericks and West 
Anglin addressed the statute at issue in this case. The language relied upon by Appellee, 
however, has since been superseded by the Utah Supreme Court. 
Anglin involved a promissory note from Contractor Fabrication Machining 
("CFM") held by Anglin. Anglin. 2001 UT App 341, Tf 2. Anglin sued to enforce the 
note, seeking a pre-judgment writ of garnishment directed to a third-party that was 
holding funds for the then-defUnct CFM. Id. Custom Steel Fabrication ("CSF"), another 
party, intervened in the suit,4 seeking to dissolve the writ of garnishment based upon an 
arrangement between CSF and the party holding the funds. Id, f 3. CSF was successful, 
and sought attorney fees. Id., 1ft 4-5. 
4
 As with West, Anglin is also distinguishable from the instant case on equitable 
grounds. In Anglin, the party seeking attorney fees voluntarily intervened in the 
underlying litigation. In the instant case, on the other hand, Unicity was sued by Mr. 
Hooban, and is only seeking fees incurred as a result of that suit. 
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Appellee cites Anglin for the proposition that "the plain meaning of [section 78B-
5-826] only applies to the parties to the contract." Appellee's Brief, 9. That portion of 
Anglin, however, has been superseded by the Utah Supreme Court in Bilanzich v. Lonetti. 
Addressing section 78B-5-826, the Bilanzich court held that the purpose of the statute 
was much more expansive than was stated in Anglin. The purpose of the statute, the Utah 
Supreme Court held, was not only to allow both parties to recover fees where only one 
had the right to assert the claim under contract, but also to "rectify] the inequitable 
common law result where a party that seeks to enforce a contract containing an attorney 
fees clause has a significant bargaining advantage over a party that seeks to invalidate the 
contract." Bilanzich, 2007 UT 26, f 18. That is precisely the situation faced by this 
Court. 
Additionally, in stating the requirements of section 78B-5-826, the Utah Supreme 
Court specifically omitted any requirement that the parties involved be the parties to the 
contract. Instead, the court held, the "first condition requires only that a party to the 
litigation asserts the writing's enforceability as basis for recovery." Bilanzich, 2007 UT 
26, f 15 (emphases added). Any language in Anglin suggesting that section 78B-5-826 
only applies to the parties to the contract, therefore, has been superseded by the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in Bilanzich. Accordingly, this Court should discount 
Appellee's argument insofar as it is based upon the superseded language in Anglin. 
9 
3. Bilanzich v. Lonetti is not only applicable, it is controlling precedent. 
Appellee's also argues that Bilanzich is inapplicable to the instant case because it 
only applies to contracting parties, and because it addresses the enforceability of the 
underlying contract as opposed to standing. Appellee is mistaken on both points. 
First, Appellee claims that the Utah Supreme Court in Bilanzich "ultimately 
concluded that the statute . . . could authorize such an award so long as the lawsuit was 
based upon a writing between the parties " Appellee's Brief, 19. This assertion is a 
misstatement of the law. Nowhere in Bilanzich does the Utah Supreme Court require that 
the writing must be "between the parties.55 In fact, the Bilanzich court specifically stated 
that "[a]ny 'promissory note, written contract, or other writing,5 falls within the ambit of 
the statute so long as the litigation is 'based upon5 that document. This first condition 
requires only that a party to the litigation assert the writing's enforceability as basis for 
recovery.55 Bilanzich, 2007 UT 26, f 15 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826) 
(emphases added). Accordingly, Appellee is incorrect in asserting that Bilanzich requires 
that the underlying contract be between the litigating parties. 
The Bilanzich court analyzed the plain language of section 78B-5-826, and 
ultimately determined "that a court may award costs and attorney fees to a prevailing 
party in a civil action if two main conditions are met.55 Bilanzich, 2007 UT 26, f 14. 
Those two conditions were that (1) "a party to the litigation assert the writing's 
enforceability as basis for recovery,55 and (2) the underlying agreement, whether 
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enforceable or not, provides for an award of attorney fees. Id. fflf 15-16. In the instant 
case, both conditions have been met (a fact that Appellee does not dispute in his brief): 
(1) Hooban asserted the agreements's enforceability as a basis for recovery, and (2) the 
agreement provides for an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party. Bilanzich is not 
limited to disputes between parties to a contract, and there is no indication in Bilanzich 
that it was intended to be. 
Appellee's second argument is that Bilanzich does not apply to disputes over 
standing, only enforcement. Appellee cites no language from Bilanzich to support this 
proposition. There is no reason that Bilanzich should be limited to disputes over the 
enforceability of a contract. Accordingly, the trial court's decision must be reversed. 
Unlike the other cases cited by Appellee, Bilanzich is directly applicable to the 
instant case. Unicity is seeking precisely the same relief that was sought in Bilanzich: a 
reversal of the trial court's decision that it could not award attorney fees to the prevailing 
party pursuant to section 78B-5-826. Nothing in Bilanzich suggests that it is not 
controlling precedent in this case. Appellee cites no language in Bilanzich. or any 
subsequent cases, that so indicates. Accordingly, it controls, and because Unicity has met 
the Bilanzich requirements, the trial court's decision should be reversed. 
III. EQUITY REQUIRES THAT UNICITY BE ABLE TO RECOVER 
ATTORNEY FEES, BECAUSE IT FACED AN UNEQUAL RISK OF 
PAYING ATTORNEY FEES. 
11 
Appellee argues that "[i]t would be inconceivable to allow Unicity on one hand 
enforce its attorney's fees provision against an individual with whom it has never 
contracted, but at the same time deny that individual the opportunity to even sue based on 
that same contract because he was not a party to it in the first place." Appellee's Brief, 
21. Appellee overlooks one glaring problem with this argument: Hooban did sue Unicity. 
The underlying litigation was neither initiated nor sought by Unicity. Unicity is only 
attempting to recover fees incurred in defending against claims. 
In Bilanzich. the Utah Supreme Court held that section 78B-5-826 "rectifies the 
inequitable common law result where a party that seeks to enforce a contract containing 
an attorney fees clause has a significant bargaining advantage over a party that seeks to 
invalidate the contract. The former could demand attorney fees if successful, while the 
latter could not." Bilanzichu 2007 UT 26, ^ 18. Where, as here, the party seeking 
attorney fees is not the party that initiated the suit, the equitable principle underlying 
section 78B-5-826 is clearly implicated. In this case, Unicity is seeking to rectify "the 
inequitable common law result" where Hooban has sued Unicity seeking to enforce a 
contract containing an attorney fees clause. Whether Hooban is a party to the contract or 
not, he chose to sue Unicity seeking to enforce the contract—and it is that decision by 
Hooban, not the trial court's determination that he is not a party, that requires that Hooban 
bear a statutory obligation to be liable for attorney fees incurred by Unicity in defending 
against his claims. 
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Reading a requirement into the statute that the underlying agreement be between 
the litigating parties, as Appellee argues, would not just be contrary to the Utah Supreme 
Court's decision in Bilanzich, it would undercut the very purpose of the statute. If such a 
requirement were imposed, it would be easier for a unsuccessful plaintiff to escape paying 
attorney fees when he sued on a contract to which he was not a party, than one to which 
he was a party. In other words, it would be easier to escape paying attorney fees in a less 
meritorious suits than for one with more merit. This result would be in direct 
contravention to public policy. 
In Bilanzich. the Utah Supreme Court held that "in order to further the statute's 
purpose, the exposure to the risk of a contractual obligation to pay attorney fees must give 
rise to a corresponding risk of a statutory obligation to pay fees." Id. f 19. There is no 
dispute that, based upon the underlying agreement and Hooban's claims thereon, Unicity 
was exposed to the "risk of a contractual obligation to pay attorney fees" if Hooban was 
successful on his claims. Id Therefore, equity demands that Hooban have "a 
corresponding risk of a statutory obligation to pay fees." Id, 
IV. APPELLEE'S INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 78B-5-826 HAS PUT 
APPELLANT IN AN UNFAIR POSITION, AND COULD SEVERELY 
PREJUDICE SIMILARLY SITUATED DEFENDANTS. 
Appellee repeatedly accuses Unicity of arguing inconsistent positions. These 
accusations highlight one final issue that must be brought to this Court's attention 
13 
regarding Appellee's misinterpretation of section 78B-5-826. Appellee argued to the trial 
court, in opposing Unicity's motion for summary judgment, that Hooban was a party to 
the agreement: 
Since the distributorship contract binds Mr. Hooban 
personally to its terms because he has a "beneficial interest" 
in the distributorship, he becomes a de-facto party to the 
contract by virtue of his beneficial interest, and has standing 
to sue on the Contract. Unicity is arguing out of both sides of 
its mouth when it cleverly claims that Mr. Hooban has no 
standing to sue. Pursuant to the terms of its contract with its 
distributors and H&H and Mr. Hooban, Mr. Hooban is bound 
in the same way H&H is bound to the contract. Unicity 
cannot have it both ways. 
R. 1275 (emphases added). Now, however, Appellee argues that Hooban was never a 
party to the agreement: 
Mr. Hooban, who never was a party to the contract at issue, is 
not even given the possibility to enforce an attorney's fees 
provision against Unicity, because he cannot even sue on the 
contract.5... It would be inconceivable to allow Unicity on 
the one hand to enforce its attorney's fees provision against 
an individual with whom it has never contracted, but at the 
same time deny that individual the opportunity to even sue 
based on the same contract because he was not a party to it in 
the first place. Unicity cannot have it both ways. 
Appellee's Brief, 21. Due to his misinterpretation of section 78B-5-826, Appellee has 
argued contradictory positions to the trial court and this Court. Having to respond to 
5
 Despite Appellee's revisionist take on the underlying proceedings ("[Mr. 
Hooban] cannot even sue" and "[the trial court] den[ied] [Mr. Hooban] the opportunity to 
even sue"), it is indisputable that Mr. Hooban did sue Unicity. It is that suit, in fact, that 
caused Unicity to incur the fees sought here. 
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these diametrically opposed positions is unfair to Unicity. 
Of even more concern, however, is the position of a hypothetical defendant in 
Unicity's position who also faced a cross-appeal on the summary judgment motion below. 
Under Appellee's misinterpretation of section 78B-5-826, a hypothetical litigant in 
Hooban's position who sought to appeal the summary judgment motion, while also 
defending the instant appeal, would necessarily have to simultaneously argue that he both 
was and was not a party to the agreement. This puts similarly situated defendants in the 
untenable position of having to simultaneously respond to two contradictory positions. 
Section 78B-5-826 therefore cannot be interpreted as argued by Appellee. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Unicity should recover attorney fees incurred in 
successfully defending against Hooban's claims. Unicity therefore respectfully requests 
that the Court of Appeals reverse the trial court's determination that no attorney fees 
could be recovered, and that the Court of Appeals instruct the trial court to exercise its 
discretion by awarding Unicity attorney fees under Utah Code section 78B-5-826. 
DATED: July 17, 2009 SMITH, CHAPMAN & CAMPBELL 
A Professional Law Corporation 
X STEVEN C. SMIT^F / v / 
^ — - J d H N S. CLIFFORD / 
Attorneys for Defendant, Counterclaimant, and 
Appellant Unicity International, Inc. 
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